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WHEN IS A JUDGE NOT AN EMPLOYEE?
PORTER v. COMMISSIONER
In Porter v. Commissioner,' the United States Tax Court held that Article III
judges are not employees, as the term is used in § 219(b)(2)(A)(iv), and therefore
they are not qualified participants in plans established for its employees by the
United States. The deduction made by the petitioner 2 for an Individual Retire-
ment Account (IRA) was therefore allowed. The deduction was disallowed by the
respondent because the respondent determined that the petitioner was an active
participant of a plan established for its employees by the United States.
This decision consolidated five cases.3 All five petitioners were either United
States Circuit Court or District Court judges. Pursuant to Article III, Section 1,
of the United States Constitution, all of the judge-petitioners are entitled to hold
office for life during good behavior and to receive a salary which cannot be
diminishedV
Sections 371 and 372 of Title 28 of the United States Code (Judicial Code)
establishes several mechanisms by which a judge or Justice who holds office for
life during good behavior (Article III judge), such as the judge-petitioners herein,
may separate from regular active service and continue to receive payments from
the United States
Pursuant to Judicial Code Sec. 371(a), an Article III judge who is at least
seventy years of age, and has served at least ten years, may resign and continue
to receive the salary that he was receiving at the time of his resignation and he
may receive it for the rest of his life
An Article III judge who is at least 70 years of age and has served at least
ten years, or who is at least 65 years of age, and who has served at least fifteen
years, is entitled to receive the same salary he was receiving at the time of his
resignation for the rest of his life. Plus, he will receive any pay increases, whereas
a resigned Article III judge does not.
Each judge-petitioner had established an IRA to which they had made timely
cash contributions, which were not in excess of the applicable limits for the years
of the contribution.
Internal Revenue Code Section 219 allows an individual a deduction for
amounts that were paid in cash to an IRA for the benefit of such individual, and
I.R.C. Section 220 allows a deduction for that person's spouse. These sections
I Porter v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 279 (1987).
2 Deductions and contributions for tax years 1980 and 1981.
3 The following cases were consolidated: Arlin M. and Neyssa C. Adams, #19368-84; William J., Jr., and
Jean M. Nealon, #26149-84; Clarance C. and Jane M. Newcomer, #29669-84; and Daniel H., 3rd, and Mary
J. Huyett, #39130-84.
4 Porter, 88 T.C. at 285.
5Id. at 280-81.
6 1d.
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disallow the deduction in a taxable year if the person is an active participant in
a plan established by the United States for its employees.
In 1981, Congress amended I.R.C. Section 219 and repealed Section 220! The
effect of this repeal was to allow individuals (and their spouses) to deduct amounts
contributed to IRAs for their benefit, regardless of whether such individuals (or
their spouse) were participants of any of the proscribed plans. In 1986, Congress
amended Section 219,8 which phased out the IRA deduction for any individual
(and their spouse) who earned above certain proscribed amounts where such in-
dividuals (or their spouse) are active participants of certain proscribed plans?
The Porter court had to determine whether the judge-participants were active
participants in a plan established by the United States for its employees. The first
step in the analysis was to determine if the Article III judges were employees of
the United States. If Article III judges were not employees, then Sec. 219
(b)(2)(A)(iv) will not apply because the Article III judges would not be active par-
ticipants in a plan established by the United States for its employees.'0 After an
in-depth review, the court determined that the definition of "employee," for the
purpose of a qualified retirement plan, is the common law definition, purposes
of Sec. 219.11
There are three classifications of the common law employee definition
recognized by the Supreme Court. These three classifications are: (1) employer-
employee relationship, (2) employee, or independent contractor, and (3) officer. 2
The more applicable classification in Porter is that of an officer. The Sixth Cir-
cuit listed five indispensable elements of an officer: (1) the office must be created
by the Constitution or the Legislature, or municipality or other body with authori-
ty conferred by the Legislature; (2) there must be a delegation of a portion of the
sovereign power of government to be exercised for the benefit of the public; (3) the
power conferred and the duties to be discharged must be defined either directly
or indirectly by the Legislative authority; (4) the duties must be performed in-
dependently and without control of a superior power other than the law and;
(5) the office must have some permanency and continuity and the officer must
take an official oath.' 3
The U.S. Supreme Court added a sixth element in Metcalf & Eddy v.
Mitchell,14 which provided that the officer should be free of control by any superior
7The Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 311(e), 95 Stat. 280 (1981) (repealing I.R.C.
§ 220); and §§ 311(a), 312(c)(1) and 313(b)(2), 95 Stat. 274, 284 and 286 (1981) (amending I.R.C. § 219).
8 As amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(c), 100 Stat. 2218 (1986).
9 1.R.C. § 219 (19 ).
10 Porter, 88 T.C. at 281-82.
Id. at 282-83.
121d. at 283 (citing family of cases following "master test" set forth in Reed v. Commissioner, 13B.T.A. 513
(1928), rev'd, 34 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1929), rev'd per curium, 281 U.S. 699 (1929).
13 1d. at 284 (citing Pope v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir. 1943)).
14 1d. (citing Metcalf& Eddy v. Mitchel, 269 U.S. 514 (1926)).
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power other than the law.
In determining whether the Article III judges are officers or employees, the
court considered the duties and powers of the judge-petitioners. In the opinion
of the court, Article III judges were officers of the United States since all five Pope
elements for such status were present.15
Since Article III judges were officers exclusively and not common law
employees, they were not employees of the United States within the meaning of
Sec. 219. As such, they were not covered by a plan established by the United States
for its employees and, therefore, Sec. 219(b)(2)(A)(iv) was not applicable to
disallow petitioners' claimed IRA deductions. 16
Even if the court had held that Article Il judges were employees of the United
States, the court would not readily have concluded that the judges were not en-
titled to their claimed IRA deductions. "Plan," as used in § 219(b)(2)(A)(iv), refers
to a retirement plan.' 7 Under Sections 371(b) and 372(a) of the Judicial Code,
Article 111 judges only technically retire as they may and often do continue to per-
form the same functions they performed prior to separation from regular active
service. Thus the payments that Article III judges receive pursuant to Judicial
Code Sections 371(b) and 372(a) are not of the same nature as payments that retired
employees receive pursuant to a retirement plan where the retired employees actu-
ally cease to perform service. Under another mechanism, Judicial Code Sec.
372(b), the right of retired judges to continued payment is granted by the Con-
stitution.' 8 This consitutional right is not considered to be a retirement plan. Fur-
ther, under Judicial Code Sec. 371(a), Article III judges no longer perform the
services they performed during regular active service. A forerunner of this pro-
vision, however, "has been held not to be in the nature of a pension, but rather
an inducement to superannuated judges to voluntarily relinquish their offices."19
Accordingly, it does not appear that Judicial Code Sections 371 and 372 establish
a retirement plan.
Unlike the payments a retired employee receives from a trust established pur-
suant to a qualified retirement plan, the payments an Article III judge receives
pursuant to Sections 371 and 372 are not made from a fund established by con-
tributions of before-tax earnings which can grow tax-free? 0 Rather, the payments
are made from current congressional appropriations and are administered iden-
tically to the manner in which the payments are administered to Article Il judges
in regular active service? Therefore, the Article III judges are not receiving the
"Porter, 88 T.C. at 285.
161d. at 287.
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.219-1(b)(2)(A)(4)(19
"sPorter, 88 T.C. at 287.
19Id.
2 0 d
.
21 Id.
1988]
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double tax benefit that Congress sought to prevent by Sec. 219(b)(2)(A).
The House Committee on Ways and Means has submitted an additional tax
proposal on revenue reconciliation consideration. Under present law, a taxpayer
is permitted to make the maximum permissible deductible IRA contribution if
the taxpayer (1) has adjusted gross income that does not exceed an applicable
dollar amount, or (2) is not an active participant.
Under the proposal by the committee, the decision in Porter v. Commissioner
would be overturned. Officers of the United States, or political subdivisions as
described in the decision, would be treated as employees for purposes of the Code.
They would be active participants for purposes of the IRA deduction limit. This
would result in a gain of less than $50 million in each of the next three fiscal
years. 22
ROBERT IAFELICE
22 supra note 22.
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